Read Online The Why Axis: Hidden Motives and the Undiscovered Economics of Everyday Life by Uri Gneezy, John List - Free Book Online Page B
Authors: Uri Gneezy, John List
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men.
The Khasi experiment sheds some insight—in this domain—into the long-standing debates about sex differences. Of course, we looked at the behavior of women in a society unlike most others in the world. But that was the point: to strip away, as much as possible, the cultural influences of a patriarchal society. In the case of the Khasi, the average woman chose to compete much more often than the average man. Or, put more simply, nature was not the only player in town. For the Khasi, nurture is king—or queen, as the case may be.
Our study suggests that given the right culture, women are as competitively inclined as men, and even more so in many situations. Competitiveness, then, is not only set by evolutionary forces that dictate that men are naturally more so inclined than women. The average woman will compete more than the average man if the right cultural incentives are in place.
Can Women Negotiate Effectively?
So how does this interest in competing affect Khasi women’s behavior in the marketplace, where strong economic incentives rule? To find out, we visited an open-air market in Shillong, where Khasi and non-Khasi people live side by side.
The Shillong open-air market—one of the largest in the world—is a lively affair. As you walk among the crowds, you take in the odor of rotting meat and blood; the fresh smell of tomatoes, onions, and peppers; the scent of flowers, straw hats, and cotton shirts. Cheap electronics and shoes flood the stalls.
To see how culture affects negotiation style, we gave Khasi and non-Khasi men and women money to buy two kilos of tomatoes in the market. Prices ranged between 20 and 40 rupees per kilo, depending on how well they haggled; our participants earned more if they negotiated a lower price. For every tomato-buying negotiation, we recorded the starting price, how long the bargaining lasted, and the ending price.
We discovered two important things. First, Khasi women, trained from birth to be assertive and self-confident, proved to be successful negotiators; our ball-tossing experiment had proven to be a good predictor of real life behavior in these markets. Our second finding was no less interesting. The market functioned very differently, depending on whether the pricing rules were set by women from the matrilineal tribe or not.
When the Khasi women entered a section of the market in which non-Khasi people set the price, men and women sold goods and haggled side by side, and the Khasi women proved themselves to be forces of nature. Shaihun was among them. She was a fantastic bargainer, reaching excellent prices for such items as tomatoes or cotton shirts for her sons. Interestingly, when Shaihun and her peers entered a section of the market in which only the Khasi set the price and only women bought and sold goods, we noticed that there was not much haggling. The shopping prices appeared, as it is in the West, to be more set than negotiated. It seemed that the surroundings and socialization were instrumental in dictating how people behaved.
The two observations are related. Women can be nurtured to react to incentives in similar ways as men and to negotiate just as well as men. But given the option, Khasi women set the incentives in their part of the market differently than men. By setting standard prices, they simply made the environment less competitive and aggressive, and they reacted to the social incentives that they themselves set.
Can Women Save Mankind from Itself?
Another lesson we learned from the Khasi is this: when women are in power, everyone seems to benefit.
In 1968, ecologist Garrett Hardin published a paper called “The Tragedy of the Commons,” in which he described what happens when a public resource becomes depleted because too many people are taking advantage of it. 1 In the article, he described a situation in medieval Europe in which herders shared a common parcel of land on which everyone was allowed to graze cattle. As long as herders
The Khasi experiment sheds some insight—in this domain—into the long-standing debates about sex differences. Of course, we looked at the behavior of women in a society unlike most others in the world. But that was the point: to strip away, as much as possible, the cultural influences of a patriarchal society. In the case of the Khasi, the average woman chose to compete much more often than the average man. Or, put more simply, nature was not the only player in town. For the Khasi, nurture is king—or queen, as the case may be.
Our study suggests that given the right culture, women are as competitively inclined as men, and even more so in many situations. Competitiveness, then, is not only set by evolutionary forces that dictate that men are naturally more so inclined than women. The average woman will compete more than the average man if the right cultural incentives are in place.
Can Women Negotiate Effectively?
So how does this interest in competing affect Khasi women’s behavior in the marketplace, where strong economic incentives rule? To find out, we visited an open-air market in Shillong, where Khasi and non-Khasi people live side by side.
The Shillong open-air market—one of the largest in the world—is a lively affair. As you walk among the crowds, you take in the odor of rotting meat and blood; the fresh smell of tomatoes, onions, and peppers; the scent of flowers, straw hats, and cotton shirts. Cheap electronics and shoes flood the stalls.
To see how culture affects negotiation style, we gave Khasi and non-Khasi men and women money to buy two kilos of tomatoes in the market. Prices ranged between 20 and 40 rupees per kilo, depending on how well they haggled; our participants earned more if they negotiated a lower price. For every tomato-buying negotiation, we recorded the starting price, how long the bargaining lasted, and the ending price.
We discovered two important things. First, Khasi women, trained from birth to be assertive and self-confident, proved to be successful negotiators; our ball-tossing experiment had proven to be a good predictor of real life behavior in these markets. Our second finding was no less interesting. The market functioned very differently, depending on whether the pricing rules were set by women from the matrilineal tribe or not.
When the Khasi women entered a section of the market in which non-Khasi people set the price, men and women sold goods and haggled side by side, and the Khasi women proved themselves to be forces of nature. Shaihun was among them. She was a fantastic bargainer, reaching excellent prices for such items as tomatoes or cotton shirts for her sons. Interestingly, when Shaihun and her peers entered a section of the market in which only the Khasi set the price and only women bought and sold goods, we noticed that there was not much haggling. The shopping prices appeared, as it is in the West, to be more set than negotiated. It seemed that the surroundings and socialization were instrumental in dictating how people behaved.
The two observations are related. Women can be nurtured to react to incentives in similar ways as men and to negotiate just as well as men. But given the option, Khasi women set the incentives in their part of the market differently than men. By setting standard prices, they simply made the environment less competitive and aggressive, and they reacted to the social incentives that they themselves set.
Can Women Save Mankind from Itself?
Another lesson we learned from the Khasi is this: when women are in power, everyone seems to benefit.
In 1968, ecologist Garrett Hardin published a paper called “The Tragedy of the Commons,” in which he described what happens when a public resource becomes depleted because too many people are taking advantage of it. 1 In the article, he described a situation in medieval Europe in which herders shared a common parcel of land on which everyone was allowed to graze cattle. As long as herders
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