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information had disappeared’. On the American military personnel, ‘enemy enquiries for further details were met with a brief reply giving three shoulder-badges noticed’. As for the address of GHQ, it had actually been supplied several months earlier. SIME noted that

    this had been asked for, and correctly answered, nearly a year before. The address is such common knowledge throughout the Middle East that a trap was suspected. But it is possible that the enemy is even more ignorant of conditions in Egypt than we suspect. His second enquiry may imply that he had lost record of the first, or that he thought there had been a move.
    Evan Simpson registered severe reservations about the questions posed by the Abwehr, as John de Salis pointed out to Dudley Clarke on 18 May that CHEESE’S position was ‘very precarious’.
    Apparently Major Robertson had some information about him: ‘the heavy hand of the British Secret Service is now apparent’, do you know anything further about this? Up to now we have struck for money.
‘Sans argent, nouvelles militaires impossible
’.
    Remuneration has been promised but no sums have as yet materialised. The enemy are now asking for information about your aeroplane factory, location, details of equipment and whether manufacturing or merely assembly shops.
    Simpson is now unwilling to carry on with this theme unless you insist on it. In my opinion there are several disadvantages. Sooner or later we shall have to locate this factory and tie it up with an existing building/installation, thereby exposing a building to bombing. We shall have to decide whether it is a factory or an assembly shop. The first is unlikely, owing to local conditions – total absence of primary materials, tools and skilled personnel. The second would have to be linked up with an area where considerable activity is already taking place where the associated features of a large factory, lodging capacity, rail/water communications, are to be found.
    The enemy are also anxious to obtain the exact location of GHQ. This was given correctly by us as Sh.E1 Birgas (i) There is no record in the file that GHQ had been consulted. (ii) This might be an indication that our message had not been received, but would appear to be much more likely a check on our veracity.
    The solution, produced by de Salis on 19 May, was to focus on three distinct themes and give the enemy the impression
    â€“ That LAMBERT is, and remains, loyal to the enemy;
    â€“ That owing to the lack of funds he has been forced to employ ‘inferior’ agents who had misled him and given him inaccurate and misleading information on – e.g. 18th Division;
    â€“ That he has now got rid of the lot and, should funds be available, he is now in a position to recruit better personnel who could and would produce the required information;
    â€“ With this new organisation we might allay the suspicion apparent … and give us a possibility of having a new start.
    SIME later recorded that
    it was not until the latter half of June that anything further was transmitted. Even then, the matter supplied was first of low grade, though in order to build up confidence it had to contain a high proportion of truth. ‘A’ Force was fortunately able to supply the enemy with information that he already possessed, new items that were unlikely to be of use to him, or truths that would probably confuse him more than a deliberate lie.
    On 2 July the Abwehr suddenly expressed renewed interest and confidence in Nicossof and instructed him to begin transmitting daily, and TRIANGLE intercepts dated 4 and 12 July referred to him as ‘credible’ and ‘trustworthy’ although Athens noted that ‘the reliability of this agent has not yet been proved’. SIME responded by having Nicossof welcome the chance to bring Rommel to Cairoand suggested that the arrival of the Germans would enable him to receive some medals